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Abstract 
The term “value of life” can refer to life’s intrinsic dignity: something non-
incremental and time-unaffected in contrast to the fluctuating, incremental “value” 
of our lives, as they are longer or shorter and more or less flourishing. Human beings 
are equal in their basic moral importance: the moral indignities we condemn in the 
treatment of e.g. those with dementia reflect the ongoing human dignity that is being 
violated. Indignities licensed by the person in advance remain indignities, as when 
people might volunteer their living, unconscious bodies for surrogacy or training in 
amputation techniques. Respect for someone’s dignity is significantly impacted by a 
failure to value that person’s very existence, whatever genuine respect and good will 
is shown by wanting the person’s life to go well. Valuing and respecting life is not, 
however, vitalism: there can be good and compelling reasons for eschewing some 
means of prolonging life. 
Key Words
Human dignity, equality, moral status, quality of life, value of life
Introduction 
What is life? And in what sense, or senses, might the lives of human beings—their 
activities or simply their presence, whether lively or quiescent—have a claim on our 
respect? Here I offer a brief illustrated sketch of one approach to the concepts of 
human life and the dignity of human life—with, of course, no illusion that these and 
their applications are addressed in anything like the depth they deserve. 
The word “life” covers a range of meanings, including whole life-span: lives can 
be long, or cut short. Alternatively, “life” can refer to our existence at some moment, 
as when we speak of “signs of life.” Then again, it can refer to spheres of life: aspects 
of life on which we will sometimes focus—work life, married life, reproductive life. 
And it seems these spheres can themselves have “dignity” or a claim on our respect, 
apart from any dignity attached to our being here at all.
However, the term “life,” when used simply on its own, often refers to our whole 
life, including when we are very young, asleep or very ill, or otherwise mentally hors 
de combat. Life normally involves a huge range of bodily activities, many of which 
remain quite unknown to us, impressive as they doubtless are. Note, though, that in 
some cases, a living “whole” or organism may have merely a tendency to act: a frozen 
embryo, perhaps in the future a frozen adult, is alive but “halted in mid-stream,” 
retaining the tendency to resume bodily activities if treated in a certain way.1
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Life can be seen, then, as either the process of functioning as a whole or as 
existence with the tendency to function: “functionality,”2 whether or not currently 
expressed. With all these senses of “life,” we are, of course, referring to bodily 
existence—the existence of the kind of beings we are: embodied wholes, not 
disembodied ghosts. While reflecting on the mind and its possible expressions after 
death may help us better understand our bodily selves, the survival of a mind awaiting 
a body to animate is not “life” in the normal sense of the term. It is the bodily lives 
of whole human beings and their dignity understood in this worldly terms that I am 
concerned with here. 
Equal Human Dignity 
If “life” for the purpose of this paper means either entire life-span or existence at 
some particular time, what does “dignity” mean? I will use the term as a placeholder 
for whatever makes it morally/reasonably appropriate to honour the subject of that 
dignity. Although dignity refers to morally/reasonably appropriate honouring, the 
subject or “moral person” is often being honoured for something other than moral 
virtue.3 While someone can certainly grow in acquired dignity or excellence in 
regard to moral/other traits, the sense of dignity I mostly want to discuss is the 
intrinsic, “core human” dignity ascribed to the kind of being we are and seen indeed 
as grounding the moral enterprise of making choices befitting that dignity of others 
and ourselves. 
Many of us subscribe to some notion of human equality, believing that human 
beings are “equal” in some sense, not in abilities or attainments, but (mutatis mutandis) 
in basic rights and, more generally, in basic standing or moral importance. We 
think that, for example, human beings are irreplaceable by any other human being, 
irrespective of any similarities4 apart from their humanity and features inseparable 
from that. This kind of dignity attaches to everyone, including deeply immoral 
people, who do not lose their human rights or turn into some lesser, “subhuman” 
or “subpersonal” kind of being. For that matter, our own activities in practice, as 
opposed to our orientation to more admirable activities, are not always something 
to be proud of, as few of us would deny. It is what I am oriented towards in terms 
of rational/relational flourishing, not how I behave in fact, which gives me my core 
human dignity as opposed to any acquired dignity, bearing in mind that however 
special a kind of being we are (and it is very special), many of our choices are quite 
mundane or flawed morally or otherwise. 
Dignity and Shame
The word “undignified” is a somewhat “lesser” word—one less likely to have strong 
moral connotations—than either “dignity” or “indignity.” Sometimes, we look or feel 
undignified in ways not immediately related to our moral choices or those of others, 
even if our shame or embarrassment does have something to do with the imagined 
or actual presence of other people. Loss of control over bodily functions is one 
obvious example. The shame or embarrassment we feel may be no one’s fault and not 
particularly a moral issue, unless by that we simply mean that those around us, where 
they cannot prevent our plight, should respond with kindness and tact. Different 
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societies will have different ways of doing this, just as they and the individuals in 
them may see different situations as undignified. 
Other times, however, shame attaches to our choices which, either in fact or 
in someone’s perception, are in some moral sense unbefitting. Then the danger is 
that any shame felt by us or others can elicit a radical turning away from what our 
human dignity now requires—even, in the most extreme cases, turning us or others 
against our very lives. We see this with honour killings and suicides connected with 
scandals of some kind, whether relating to criminal behaviour or to non-criminal but 
socially frowned-on behaviour, such as extramarital affairs. Of course, the dignity of 
the person is far better served by facing, if need be, some degree of social shame and/
or punishment, avoiding both self-harm and harm inflicted by violent individuals or 
groups. Such scenarios may sound remote from our own experience, but in secular 
Western countries, too, feelings of shame and fear can trigger a life-ending response, 
often involving a pregnancy a girl or woman feels driven to abort. One moral indignity, 
such as sexual exploitation, can lead to another, even if the pregnant woman may still 
sense, in her desperation, that her own dignity is once again being violated.
Moral Indignities
Moral indignities inflicted by others come in many forms, bearing in mind that 
we can also be mistaken in feeling disrespected. Again, the fact that I can undergo 
genuine moral indignities (and behave in a morally unfitting way myself) testifies 
to the dignity, and perhaps the intrinsic dignity, which is being dishonoured. This 
also applies to situations where other people are not so much hostile as indifferent to 
us or, at least, to something about us which deserves more consideration. Nor does 
it seem that the victim must perceive the moral indignity as what it is (slaves, for 
example, may have internalised others’ view of them) or even be mentally capable of 
perceiving it in the longer term. The moral indignities we condemn in the treatment 
of elderly people with dementia, for example, are a sign that, despite their cognitive 
impairment, they have dignity that is being violated. As Alexander Pruss points out: 
It is no indignity for a rock to have mud poured over it. Making fun of a monkey does 
not harm the monkey. Moreover, only a being with great dignity can suffer a great 
indignity. Thus, that some beings suffer horrendous indignities entails that these 
beings have great dignity.5 
Note that moral indignities can be licensed by the person himself/herself, whether 
at the time or in advance, while remaining moral indignities. For example, some 
have entertained the possibility of treating permanently unconscious people in 
ways intended to help other people but which, nonetheless, seem to demean the 
one so treated. They have mooted the idea of people volunteering, in advance of 
entering a permanently unconscious state, to be used in dangerous non-therapeutic 
experiments,6 while one author suggests that women might volunteer to be surrogate 
mothers, should they fall into an unconscious state.7 If the living human being has 
intrinsic human dignity, then surely such actions will violate that dignity, despite 
being carried out with the subject’s prior consent. There is little respect in the first 
case for the value of one’s remaining health8 as an aspect of the welfare of the kind of 
being one is or, in the second case, for the rich social meaning that human pregnancy 
and the human acts initiating pregnancy should carry. Our intrinsic dignity and what 
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inherently violates that dignity is not up to us to determine, any more than it is up to 
others. Moreover, moral indignities we request or authorise can have bad effects on 
those in a similar condition to our own. We will come back to this later on.
Dignity and Foetal Anomaly
Questions of dignity often arise in relation to end-of-life care, often care of the 
very elderly. Less often, end-of-life care will be perinatal care of babies diagnosed 
prenatally as having a life-limiting condition.9 Here again, terms like dignity or related 
terms like “honour” and “respect” are sometimes used by women who continue the 
pregnancy after the child’s condition is disclosed. Thus, one woman describes her 
devastation at hearing the result of her ultrasound scan, followed immediately by the 
offer of abortion: 
I felt as though no one in the medical profession valued our baby because of her 
genetic makeup…I wanted to love and honour the life of our little girl and I wanted 
everyone else to do so too.10 
It is striking that parents who, in contrast, choose abortion in these heartrending 
situations tend to use the word “honour” more in relation to the baby’s remains or 
memory or perhaps her spirit, not the living child, focused on while she was still 
alive.11 The child scheduled for abortion may be loved while she is still alive, but the 
questions remain: is her dignity fully respected and is her “being” fully appreciated? 
These are painful questions, but for love to be fully respectful and unsentimental, it 
would seem there must be full appreciation of the loved one’s presence, not just a desire 
to confer some benefit on the loved one: in this case, the perceived benefit of death. 
Alexander Pruss12 identifies three aspects of love—appreciation, beneficence, and a 
desire for “union” of some kind—which do not seem to be unambiguously present 
where death is sought as a benefit for the loved one (we will return to this below). 
The significantly worse emotional aftermath for women of abortion, compared to 
continuing the pregnancy where the child has a life-limiting condition,13 may suggest 
that wanting to honour one’s child in death is no substitute for knowing that one 
honoured and accepted her unreservedly in life. (Worth noting is the strongly dualist 
tone to many parents’ reflections following these profoundly disturbing abortions, 
where the “real” child is seen more as the child’s spirit “released” by death than as the 
living, bodily unborn child herself.14) 
Incremental “Value”; Intrinsic Dignity
Returning to the perspective of those who continue the pregnancy after a terminal 
diagnosis, the remarks of one mother suggest that “value” is being used in a sense 
more like “intrinsic dignity,” one different to the sense in which life’s “value” would 
seem to be variable and incremental. Susan says of her son Frankie: 
All of us have an inevitable death in the offing. Frankie was no different from the 
rest of us. We began to see that we could not measure the value of our baby’s life in 
terms of years or even months or days.15
The mother of another child, Corinne, had this to say: 
We were transformed by the experience of embracing life without putting expectations 
or limits on her value…. Our devotion to a child who was brought into this world 
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not because of what she could do for us but for the dignity she brought simply as a 
human being and member of our family emphasized to [our other children] their own 
worth…They know now more concretely the unconditional love we have for each 
of them and that their worth is not predicated by their looks or accomplishments.16
Often, when we talk about the value or worth of life, we are really talking about life’s 
intrinsic dignity, a dignity which is non-incremental and time-unaffected, in contrast 
to the fluctuating, incremental “value” of our lives17 as they are longer or shorter and 
more or less flourishing. Life is no different from other “human goods” or aspects 
of human fulfilment in that we can have more or less of it—more or less life, as 
we might have more or less friendship, say, or more or less knowledge. There is no 
problem with saying that thirty more years of life are, in themselves, more valuable 
for me than three minutes more of life, or with saying that those thirty years are, in 
themselves, worth more to me—since physical “full-being” is a dimension of human 
flourishing—if my health is good, rather than poor. (Note that I am not speaking here 
of the moral and social sense in which, sometimes, more importance may be achieved 
in three minutes—say, in terms of making peace with estranged family members—
than I may have achieved in the past thirty years.) 
Childhood is for later adulthood; there is a real sense in which my life as a 
developed adult is worth more to me in the short term than my life as a three-year-
old child, when, however, I had significant long-term interests in developing those 
more mature capacities, projects, and relationships. However, when it comes to the 
intrinsic, core dignity of life, then three minutes, three years, or even thirty years 
cannot add to or subtract from this dignity in any way. Morally, I matter in my very 
being, and this applies to every minute and every second, just as I am no more or less 
a human being if I have a minute or second more to live. 
Fulfilling Humankind
What might this intrinsic dignity be, though? Remember that even the youngest and 
most damaged human being is a member of the human kind: a special rational kind, 
different from any other kind of animal we know. Her body, simply as a human body, 
is oriented to rational fulfilment, even if such fulfilment will be unattainable for the 
remainder of her life. Even a baby missing much of her brain is “missing” that part 
because that part is one she should have, as other parts testify (for example, her lower 
brain which “ought” to support the missing part or indeed her vocal cords which 
“ought” to help her speak when she is old enough to do so). A dying baby is no less a 
rational kind of being for the fact she is too sick to grow up to think, just as she is no 
less a mammal for the fact she is too sick to feed from her mother or to grow up and 
perhaps feed a baby of her own. 
Health and sickness are value terms to be applied to particular kinds of being 
whose flourishing depends on particular features. We do not let the illness define the 
person, as if it made him or her a different kind of being, but it is by looking at other 
humans and how they function and flourish that we understand illness and how it 
might be treated. Something similar can be said of non-human animals, but while it is 
a pity that some seagulls cannot fly, it is vastly more of an issue if a being who should 
be able to think is injured in that or some other function. We can value animals’ lives 
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and their health without denying the very obvious chain of being in our world where 
humans are clearly at the top of that chain and seagulls far below. 
As human beings, we differ amongst ourselves in many ways, including the 
precise form our health interests take: a baby, but not an adult, has an objective, long-
term interest in growing up (including sexual maturation), while a girl, but not a boy, 
has an interest in acquiring the capacity to conceive and gestate a child. However, we 
are all the same basic kind of being, whose form of fulfilment is shared by those of 
our own kind (with some adjustments for age and sex) and whose fulfilment is always 
morally important, as the same fulfilment in the life of one and the same living being. 
The status of human life cannot be demoted by disease to that of the life of a lower 
animal. Human beings have interests in a far richer range of goods than non-rational 
animals, whose range is very much their own. When things go badly for us, there is 
more of which we are deprived: more value missing, for the very reason that there is 
also more value (“dignity”) present in the orientation to rationality that we always 
possess. Our interests matter, not as free-floating entities, but as our interests—those 
of the persisting members of the rational bodily kind that we always were. 
Valuing Human Existence
If we respect and even love our fellow human beings, we should appreciate them in 
a special way and, so I am claiming, strongly value their existence as irreplaceable 
beings. Respect for someone is significantly dented by a failure to value that person’s 
very existence, whatever genuine respect and good will is shown by wanting the 
person’s life to go well. As Stephen Brock observes: 
It would be a mistake to think that in “wanting good for some being” what is wanted 
must always be other than the being that it is wanted for. This would make little sense. 
In loving a friend, one does not just want other goods to exist, for him; one surely 
also wants him to exist, for him. One wants his wellbeing. A necessary element of 
this is his simply being... the object of love of friendship, as such, is not only a being 
for which good is wanted, but also a good that is wanted—for itself.18 
Part of complete respect and love for someone is the perception: it is good that you 
exist. Nor need this always be linked to any beneficent action, even in the context 
of health care. Rather, the carer will sometimes be simply acknowledging and 
appreciating the sheer presence of the person cared for, as something valuable in 
itself. Life can and should be valued, even at moments when it is not being actively 
promoted. 
Dignity and Deliberate Ending of Life 
If the dignity of human life must always be acknowledged, is that ever compatible 
with deliberate ending of life or deliberate lethal force applied to the person? 
Certainly, no one should be killed, not as a current aggressor or as someone who may 
deserve punishment for a past crime, but simply because they are in our way and/or 
their death can serve our ends. To treat people simply as obstacles to our plans, for 
example, and deliberately end their lives for that reason is not to treat them as having 
equal human dignity to our own. And as regards the value of life, as opposed to the 
perceived utility of death to other people, it would be quite wrong to suggest that 
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the lives of prisoners on Death Row, for example, had no value. A society troubled 
enough to want to execute its criminals needs to find a better argument than that. 
In contrast, with euthanasia the message may indeed be that life has no value 
or dignity, or at any rate that no value or dignity is present of a kind that prevents 
the deliberate taking of the life in question. It is one thing to say that life is not 
“good” (long or flourishing) enough to justify burdensome means of life extension; 
it is something else entirely to say that life is not “good” enough and does not have 
“dignity” of a kind to prevent its deliberate termination. A conundrum for legislatures 
where euthanasia can be requested in advance of loss of mental capacity is what to 
say about the elderly person who now has dementia but seems quite contented: should 
such a person be euthanised merely because he or she requested it earlier, no doubt 
on the basis that life with dementia was seen as lacking dignity? If society carries 
out choices made, perhaps quite explicitly, on the grounds that life in such conditions 
has no dignity, is not society seeming at least to endorse that unflattering view of the 
person’s life? And what does such endorsement say about the dignity of other people 
living with dementia? 
A similar argument can be made about other conditions where the person is 
mentally competent and expects to remain so but recoils from dependency or “being 
a burden”: what message does it give to endorse that choice but not the choice of 
healthier suicidal people, where the message given rather is that their lives have value 
despite how they themselves view their lives? Yes, aspects of one’s medical care—
even good, respectful19 medical care—may be “undignified” in the more trivial sense 
mentioned earlier, and one may feel them, at least in anticipation, as shameful and/or 
morally unfitting. However, to say that those aspects and the very life they support are 
in fact shameful or morally unfitting seems a kind of insult,20 however unintended, to 
others living with the relevant condition. 
Nothing about us makes us infallible guides on the value of our lives or, indeed, 
on other aspects of our welfare. If I say that friends are unimportant and money is 
all that counts, my opinion is one thing; reality is another. Just as I can disrespect 
friendship or knowledge, I can disrespect the value and dignity of my own life, 
whether now (because I see current dependency as a state lacking dignity) or in some 
imagined future (because I see future dependency and perhaps cognitive impairment 
as constituting such a state). 
Dignity and Autonomy
Of course, many will claim that appeals to the dignity of life, at least in the case of 
competent patients, should give way to appeals to the dignity of choice or personal 
autonomy. And certainly, there are cases, such as refusal of unwanted treatment, 
where health care providers and the State do need to step back and allow people to 
make their own decisions and their own mistakes in a matter that concerns them 
first and foremost. That said, there are forms of harm, especially deliberate harm, of 
oneself and others with regard to which no State and no health care provider can afford 
to remain passive, let alone become involved. Homicide and suicide are paradigmatic 
cases of personal choices of pressing public concern. That includes cases where 
people are killed “for their own sake”: because they wanted this, and/or because—in 
their view and/or their carers’ view—their life has “no dignity.” We might ask: is this 
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any less a failure of respect than using someone after loss of consciousness in harmful 
or lethal research, or perhaps to train medical students in, say, amputation? Is it any 
less harmful and demoralising to society, bearing in mind that many more people will 
feel suicidal for one or other reason21 than will want to die in lethal research—not to 
mention those likely to be killed non-voluntarily once euthanasia, in particular, has 
been legalised?22 The latter scenario may not be morally worse than, but certainly 
adds to, the moral disvalue of life-ending projects shared between doctors and those 
patients who are competent to choose death. 
It is worth remembering that even our legitimate concern to defer to people’s 
preferences where possible is often a matter of respecting the person rather than 
valuing the preferences themselves. People are more than their preferences, which 
can be unworthy of them to form and unworthy of us to endorse, even in those kinds 
of cases where we do need, at least, to “step aside.” The faculty of choosing, like our 
other mental faculties, is valuable precisely as (albeit imperfectly) geared towards 
genuinely good ends: forms of human fulfilment such as life and health, knowledge, 
and friendship that at times we freely pursue. Choices should respect oneself and 
others; there are also some limits to the leeway that society should allow people 
to choose in ways that show—whatever the good faith of those who make those 
choices—especially serious disrespect. Even if some latitude must be allowed in the 
service of privacy and freedom to choose well (including under personal pressure), 
whether that applies to a particular kind of choice will depend entirely on what is 
being chosen.
Caricatures of Respect for the Dignity of Life
All that said, there are many ways in which respect for the dignity of life is often 
misunderstood and indeed caricatured, both as regards end of life situations and 
refusal of treatment during pregnancy. Respect for the dignity of life does not mean 
“vitalism”: taking all conceivable means to prolong life. There are many cases where 
life-prolonging interventions should be withheld or withdrawn, whether because these 
are rejected by a competent patient (who has first responsibility for his or her own 
health) or simply because the burdens they create for the patient are unwarranted by 
any slight benefits they may bring. Life is not the only human good, and we are often 
entitled to pursue other goods (for example, “quality time” at home with our families), 
even when life and health will be foreseeably impacted. Respect for the dignity of 
life means, in the first place, refraining— refraining from deliberate attacks on life 
(including deliberate attacks by omission) where there is no question of crime or 
attacks on others on the part of the person killed. 
Similarly, with pregnancy, respect for the dignity of life—applying simultaneously 
to two separate, though intimately linked, living beings—does not require promoting 
at any cost the perceived health interests of either the woman or her baby. We might 
think of caesarians, which might be refused23 by a competent woman confronting 
a difficult labour: whether she is right or wrong to refuse in a particular case, her 
guardianship over her baby, and also over her own body that would be invaded, surely 
extends this far. 
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Conscientious Refusal of Life-Saving Treatment
Other interventions may be refused by the patient and/or the doctor because those 
interventions are judged by the patient or the doctor to be morally unjustified. For 
example, a cardiac patient might refuse a heart transplant out of concerns about the 
determination of death in “beating heart cadavers.” Returning to pregnancy, a woman 
carrying triplets or quadruplets might refuse “pregnancy reduction,” i.e. a lethal 
injection for one or more of the foetuses she is carrying. She might refuse this even to 
promote the safe delivery of her other babies, and even this could also safeguard her 
own health, which might be threatened by a multiple pregnancy. Pregnancy is, it can 
be argued,24 a human relationship, not a relationship between two things or between 
a person and a thing. Just as the woman should not be reduced to a “carrier” (she is a 
pregnant mother, not a subhuman object), so her baby or babies should not be reduced 
to “carried contents” of the womb or “products” of their own conception. The dignity 
of the woman’s life, her child’s life, and their pregnancy relationship demands more 
respect than that. 
Conclusion
The dignity of life should be perceived as a matter of second nature, producing some 
degree of awe in us that protects us from temptations to take life unjustly or helps us 
resist these if they arise. Beginning in our own minds, there is an onus on us to think 
of each other’s existence in respectful terms or, at very least, not in disrespectful 
terms. In the practical arena, we respect the dignity of life by, first of all, “stepping 
back”: this is about choices we should not make in the first instance, as opposed 
to those we should. Choices to end life, or to assault lethally an innocent person 
who is attacking no one, are choices to avoid, whether the individual is a suicidal 
elderly person, a pregnant woman, or the foetus she is carrying. That said, when such 
negative duties have been respected, there are many strong, if contingent, positive 
duties to support human life, whether via healthcare or in other ways. And going 
beyond duty, there are many further positive opportunities to promote the welfare of 
old and frail and disabled people and pregnant women and babies, whether these are 
members of our own families or of the wider family from which we all come. The 
absolute moral implications of the dignity of human life may be wholly or largely 
negative, but a world in which only such negative duties were recognised would be a 
poor world indeed. 
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